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My task is twofold. On the one side, I must give an account on the European constitutional process. 
My report must have an informative value, in order for us to be able to develop a comparison with 
the Canadian experience. On the other side, as the topic addressed is a new and highly controversial 
constitutional process, a purely descriptive account would be unsatisfactory and not entirely useful 
for the discussion. Inevitably, I am somehow called to enter into the constitutional debate. This sort 
of “duty to engage in the discussion” on the Constitution of Europe deserves to be investigated from 
the viewpoint of constitutional history and political philosophy. I will thus pose a theoretical and 
normative question on the relationship between transnational governance and communication 
policy: what does it mean that the European Union “opened up a debate” and started a constitutional 
reform process in order to bring itself “closer to the citizens” (Laeken Declaration, 2001)? 
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Still unborn and already compelled to walk around the streets and speak to people 
F. Kafka, Diaries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
My task is twofold. On the one side, I must give an account on the European constitutional process. 
My report must have an informative value, in order for us to be able to develop a comparison with 
the Canadian experience. On the other side, as the topic addressed is a new and highly controversial 
constitutional process, a purely descriptive account would be unsatisfactory and not entirely useful 
for the discussion. Inevitably, I am somehow called to enter into the constitutional debate. This sort 
of “duty to engage in the discussion” on the Constitution of Europe deserves to be investigated from 
the viewpoint of constitutional history and political philosophy. I will thus pose a theoretical and 
normative question on the relationship between transnational governance and communication 
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policy: what does it mean that the European Union “opened up a debate” and started a constitutional 
reform process in order to bring itself “closer to the citizens” (Laeken Declaration, 2001)?  
 
Until now, one of the main purposes of liberal constitutionalism, the most classical one, has not 
been to bring the power “closer to the citizens”, but to distance the citizens from the power: to 
protect them from a power which was already too “close”, potentially dangerous and intrusive. 
Liberal constitutionalism sharply distinguished between state and civil society in the effort of 
keeping civil society as separate as possible from the state. Within the tradition of democratic 
constitutionalism as well, the goal of bringing the authority closer to the citizens appears to be 
questionable. It cannot be easily identified with the ideal of self-government. “Bringing the power 
closer to the people” is not identical to “power to the people”, not only because in the former case 
the power remains separate from the people, but also because here the issue at stake is to increase 
the legitimacy of an existing authority – the European Union. 
 
I will proceed in the following way. I will identify four distinct phases, or “constitutional 
processes”, of the European integration. Firstly, in the context of post-war Europe, the foundation of 
the European Community and the crisis of the “jus publicum Europaeum” (§ 2.). Secondly, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the creeping process of the Treaties’ constitutionalization: the shaping of a 
judge-made constitution for Europe in a time of protracted political crisis of the Community project 
(§ 3.). Thirdly, in the 1980s and 1990s, the renewed political commitment to European integration 
by the national governments is at the basis of the semi-permanent Treaty revision process. The 
institutional reforms go along with the establishment of a distinctive “economic constitution” of 
Europe and with the progressive deepening and enlargement of the Community/Union (§ 4.). 
Finally, we now face the fourth phase, the constitutional debate launched at Laeken and culminated 
in the Constitutional Treaty, in the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the referendums held in 
France and the Netherlands, in the Lisbon Treaty and in the negative Irish referendum of June 2008. 
Today’s Europe is confronted with a palpable legitimacy crisis and with the lack of significant 
constitutional outcomes of the reform process, at least with respect to the initial expectations of 
many (§ 5.).  
 
The last phase must be seen on the background of the constitutional antecedents. If the goal of the 
last constitutional phase was to bring Europe closer to its citizens, the outcomes of the process 
cannot be assessed without taking into consideration the position of the citizen within each phase. 
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Thus, with regard to every phase I will shortly recall the main constitutional developments brought 
forward, and also address the question on “who deliberates on what”.  
 
The main thesis of this article is that the creation and the failure of the constitutional debate has 
much to do with the gradual development of “publicity” (pubblicità), intended as policy object and 
governance function: the public management of communication aimed at creating public sphere, 
improving political communication, participation and trust, building consensus and legitimacy for a 
governance agency (§ 7.). Publicity emerged from the domain of public relations, and bears some 
uncanny similarity with political propaganda and marketing. The rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty shall also be regarded, amongst other things, as a rejection of publicity. By analyzing the 
four constitutional processes, I will outline a short genealogy of publicity within the European 
governance: from publicity among distinct institutional actors and epistemic communities, namely 
the courts and the jurists, to its generalization to the public at large (§ 6.). 
 
Finally, I will address the normative question “what has to be done?” (§ 8.). What can we learn 
from the failure of the constitutional debate? Should Europe remain a matter of technicians and 
lobbyists – a common market organization, an international forum for intergovernmental 
bargaining, an un-political “regulative state” – or should it strive for becoming a democratic polity? 
In the latter case, how should we improve the amount and the quality of political communication 
within the European public sphere?  
 
 
2. A constitutional event. The creation of the European Community 
 
The first constitutional phase is strongly linked to the post-war geopolitical situation. At the time, 
the goals of European integration were clear: to prevent war in Europe, especially between France 
and West Germany, to secure the future position of Germany within the Western block, to deepen 
the political and economic ties between the European countries of the “free world” by strengthening 
their free-market orientation1. According to an authoritative contemporary, the leading German 
international lawyer Hermann Mosler, the novelty of the EC resided  
                                                 
1
 This quite orthodox narrative of the creation of the EC has been partially questioned by A.S. Milward, The European 
Rescue of the Nation-State, London-New York, Routledge, 20002; A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, New York, Cornell UP, 1998; J. Gillingham, European 
Integration, 1950-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy?, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2003; stressing economic 
factors and commercial interests of the Member States over ideology and geopolitical factors. Yet, even Moravcsik 
recognises that “[g]eopolitical ideas and security externalities were not entirely unimportant” (The Choice for Europe, 
 5 
 
not in the economical conception, nor in the political conception, but in their union. The plot of economic 
interests must be the material presupposition which prevents the political disintegration of the Member States, 
as they are united under the threat of the Eastern bloc2. 
 
Mosler was referring to the Treaty of Paris, but his observation can be extended to the Treaties of 
Rome. Also the Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the Council 
of Europe (1949), and the European Convention on Human Rights were all part of the same 
political scenario. European integration was closely related to the East-West divide of the 
international arena and domestic politics. Possibly the impetus for regional integration came mainly 
from the national governments, as the real issue at stake was “the rescue of the nation state”3, or 
perhaps the development of the Community was driven by transnational factors and implied a 
significant move “beyond the nation state”4. In both cases, it would be difficult to deny that after 
two world wars the state-centred international law system had collapsed in Europe, and that 
between USA and USSR, no European state could claim full sovereignty. European integration was 
closely related to the international arena and domestic politics’ East-West divide, and it must be 
seen as a political response to that scenario. 
 
The foundation of the Community was not only an event in the sphere of geopolitics but also in the 
domain of the law. Obviously, we may grasp the full magnitude of the event only with the benefit of 
hindsight: at the time, the political future of the Community was highly uncertain, as it has always 
remained, and therefore also its legal nature was at least obscure. The issue was highly debated 
between the jurists. Heinz Wagner recalls that in the 1950s and early 1960s the Community was 
seen as  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
cit., p. 90), and A.S. Milward underlines the extent to which anticommunism was at work in the minds of the European 
leaders. The orthodox narrative still holds some merit: at the time, the “German question” and Western Europe’s 
alignment with the United States could not be ignored. In European integration history, see B. Olivi, L’Europa difficile. 
Storia politica dell’integrazione europea 1948-2000, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001; M. Gilbert, Surpassing Realism. The 
Politics of European Integration Since 1945, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; D.A. Messenger, Dividing Europe: 
The Cold War and European Integration, in D. Dinan (ed.), Origins and Evolution of the European Union, Oxford, 
Oxford UP, 2006, pp. 31-53; M. Barberis, L’Europa del diritto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008, cap. VII. 
2
 H. Mosler, Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Strahl. Entstehung und Qualifizierung, 
“Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht”, 14, 1951-2, p. 23. 
3
 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, cit. 
4
 E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, Stanford UP, 1964. In 
the contemporary literature on European integration, “beyond the nation state” is a phrase that can be upheld by 
different theoretical and political perspectives. See f.i. D. Held, Global Covenant. The Social Democratic Alternative to 
the Washington Consensus, Cambridge Polity Press, 2004; J. Habermas, La costellazione postnazionale (1998), Milano, 
Feltrinelli, 1999; E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum, The European Union and Post-national Integration, ARENA Working 
Papers WP 99/9, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp99_9.htm; A. Negri, L’Europa e l’Impero. Riflessioni su un 
processo costituente, Roma, manifestolibri, 2003. 
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völkerrechtliches Vertragsverhältnis, (…) internationale oder zwischenstaatliche Organisation oder Union, (…) 
Verwaltungsgemeinschaft, Staatenbund, partieller Bundesstaat, partieller Wirtschaftsstaat, Teilweltbundesstaat, 
Präföderation, partielle Föderation, funktionale Föderation, Gemeinschaft zur gesamten Hand, wirtschaftliches 
Condominium, Realunion, Rechtsfähiger öffentlichrechtlicher Marktverband des internationalen Rechts, 
politiche Behörden, überstaatlicher Zweckverbund, istituzione di istituzioni, Montankartell, service public und 
(…) Gebilde sui generis5.  
 
Dozen, perhaps hundreds of jurists wrote on the legal nature of the Community, several thousands 
of pages were devoted to the topic, and the theoretical proposals proliferated irresistibly. Was the 
Community a federal state in-the-making, or was it an international organization amongst others? 
Generally speaking, the latter view was predominant among the national legal communities in the 
1950s and the 1960s. However, we may well speak of a “constitutional event” with regard to the 
foundation of the Community: a significant break with the tradition of the State-centred jus 
publicum Europaeum.  
 
Those, both federalists and anti-federalists, who argued that the creation of the Community marked 
a “legal revolution” and that the Community was a “sui generis” entity6, proved to be right. The 
institutional architecture was indeed unique among international organizations (majority voting in 
the Council of Ministers, autonomy of the High Authority/Commission – both ephemeral, as we 
will see –, an independent Court of Justice and a would-be European Parliament), but the main 
novelty was represented by the establishment of a normative authority. Although there had been 
precedents (the Commissions of the River Danube, established in 1856 and 1921, operative until the 
second world war), the creation of “directly applicable” legal instruments (regulations and 
decisions) marked the most radical shift in international law. Some jurists concluded that the 
individual had became subject of international law: international law had ceased to be only inter-
state law, since it had started to address the individuals. Others authors concluded that international 
law had remained unaffected by the creation of the Community, because EC law was totally distinct 
from international law. In both cases, it was clear that the Member States had accepted limitations 
on their internal sovereignty: the commitment to “an ever closer union” (Preamble EEC Treaty), if 
taken seriously, implied that co-existence and non-interference among sovereign states, the 
founding principles of classic international law, should have been replaced with a principle of 
                                                 
5
 H. Wagner, Grundbegriffe des Beschlussrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München, 
Heymanns, 1965, p. 3. See also P. Economides, Le pouvoir de décision des organisations internationales européennes, 
A. W. Sythoff, Leyde 1964; V. Costantinesco, Compétences et pouvoires dans les Communautés européennes. 
Contribution a l’etude da la nature juridique des Communautes, Paris, Pichon et Durand-Auzias, 1974. More references 
in G. Itzcovich, Teorie e ideologie del diritto comunitario, Torino, Giappichelli, 2006, pp. 87 ff. 
6
 Among others, R. Schuman, Préface a Reuter, La Communauté Européenne de Charbon et de l’Acier, Parigi, 1953, p. 
7 ; E. Van Raalte, The Treaty Instituting the Coal and Steel Community, in “International Comparative Law Quarterly”, 
1952, pp. 73 ff.; P. Guggenheim, Universalismo e regionalismo europeo nel diritto internazionale, in “Comunità 
Internazionale”, 1953, p. 422; R. Monaco, Le comunità sopranazionali nell’ordinamento internazionale, in “Comunità 
Internazionale”, 1953, pp. 441-458. 
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integration. The Community was a new authority and the European Court of Justice was a new 
jurisdiction: new procedures, competences and regulations, new rights and duties for the states and 
for its citizens. An “autonomous legal order” (ECJ, Van Gend en Loos, 1963) had been established, 
bringing in new rules of recognition, change and adjudication.  
 
Who were the actors of this constitutional event? No clear-cut answer can be given, as all depends 
on the range of causative links which we are inclined to take into account. If we stress the crisis of 
the state as exclusive international actor and decision-making authority, then social and political 
pluralism, transnational market economy, international working-class movement are all crucial 
factors, as Carl Schmitt had already envisaged in his writings of the 1920s and 1930s7. If we limit 
the range of causal connections to the more proximate ones, then the actors of the Community 
foundation can be circumscribed to those individuals more directly engaged in the international 
organization process: politicians, diplomats, high civil servants, economists and jurists.  
 
Indeed, the role of the technicians has always been important in the Community experience. Jean 
Monnet and his collaborator, the jurist Paul Reuter, were inspired by the model of the 
administrative authorities in the United States: “to entrust independent personalities with the 
responsibility of exercising a semi-judicial, administrative or even economic function”8. In 1957, 
the French international law scholar René-Jean Dupuy recognised in the High Authority (the 
forerunner of the Commission) “the first historical example of the international advent of 
technocrats”9. One year later, Ernst Haas explained the “emphasis on elites in the study of 
integration” with the “bureaucratized nature of European organizations of long lasting, in which 
basic decisions are made by the leadership, sometimes over the opposition and usually over the 
indifference of the general membership”10.  
                                                 
7
 See f.i. C. Schmitt, La condizione storico-spirituale dell’odierno parlamentarismo (1923 and 1926), Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2004; C. Schmitt, Il concetto di “politico” (1932), in Id., Le categorie del “politico”, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
1972, pp. 87 ff., on the political pluralism, the crisis of the state and the politicisation of economy; Id., Posizioni e 
concetti. In lotta con Weimar-Ginevra-Versailles 1923-1939, Milano, Giuffrè, 2007. See also Id., Il Nomos della terra 
(1950), Milano, Adelphi, 1991; Id., La rivoluzione legale mondiale (1978) and L’ordinamento del mondo dopo la 
Seconda guerra mondiale (1962), in Id., Un giurista davanti a se stesso. Saggi e interviste, Vicenza, Neri Pozza, 2005, 
pp. 187 ff., 217 ff. 
8
 P. Reuter, Aux origines du Plan Schuman, in Mélanges Fernand Dehousse, Vol. II, La construction européenne, Paris, 
Nathan, 1979, pp. 65 ff. See P. Gerbet, La Haute Autorité de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, in 
E.V. Heyen (ed.), Die Anfänge der Verwaltung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Jahrbuch für europaische 
Verwaltungsgeschichte, 4, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1992, p. 13, and R. Mogan, Jean Monnet and the ECSC 
Administration: Challenges, Functions and the Inheritance of Ideas, ivi, pp. 1-9. 
9
 R.-J. Dupuy, L’organisation internationale et l’expression de la volonté générale, in “Revue générale de droit 
international public”, 61, 1957, pp. 527-579, p. 564. See also P. Reuter, Techniciens et politiques dans l’organisation 
internationale, in Institut d’études juridiques de Nice (ed.), Politique et technique, Paris, PUF, 1955, pp. 181-196. 
10
 E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1957-1957, Stanford, Stanford UP, 19682, 
p. 17. 
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The public debate on European issues never totally disappeared, but the politics of European 
integration remained largely dependent on the activity of the technicians. The functioning and the 
evolution of the Community resulted from the interaction of more or less accountable bodies (the 
EC institutions and the national governments, parliaments and courts). The general public opinion 
was nearly absent from the dynamic. According to Millward, the diplomats had kept European 
integration away from the influence of popular will, “for popular opinion if allowed to intrude too 
early might well have stopped the whole construction”11. Definitely, at the time the European 
Community did not aim at bringing itself “closer to the citizens”: its goals were the creation of a 
common market, a custom union, a common agricultural policy, conceived as means for preventing 
war, ensuring international stability, fostering economic development and furthering political 
integration.  
 
 
3. The constitutionalization of the EC Treaties 
 
As there have been doctors that hold there be three souls in a man; so there be also that think there may be more souls, 
that is, more sovereigns, than one in a Commonwealth; and set up a supremacy against the sovereignty; canons against 
laws; and a ghostly authority against the civil; working on men's minds with words and distinctions that of themselves 
signify nothing, but bewray, by their obscurity, that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another kingdom, as it were 
a kingdom of fairies, in the dark. 
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch 29 
  
After the founding phase of the Community, a second phase begins, which is often referred to as the 
Treaties “constitutionalization” process12. Apparently it is a time of political crisis of European 
integration13. The Hallstein Commission was stopped14, the political autonomy of the Commission 
                                                 
11
 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, cit., p. 17. 
12
 J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, in “Yearbook of European Law”, 1, 
1981, pp. 267-306; Id., Il sistema comunitario europeo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, pp. 64 ss; Id., The Transformation of 
Europe (1991), in Id., The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1999, pp. 10 ff.; C. Joerges, Taking the 
Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Rule of Law in the Process of European Integration, in “European Law 
Journal”, 2, 1996, pp. 105-135; A. Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford, 
Oxford UP, 2000; H. Schepel, Reconstructing Constitutionalization: Law and Politics in the European Court of Justice, 
in “Oxford Journal of Legal Studies”, 20/3, 2000, pp. 457-468; K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European 
Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2001; A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial 
Construction of Europe, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2004; G.F. Mancini, Democrazia e costituzionalismo nell’Unione 
europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004. 
13
 The “stagnation” of European integration in the 1960s and 1970s is another cliché that has been seriously questioned 
by recent historical research. See M. Gilbert, Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European 
Integration, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 46/3, 2008, pp. 641-662. It is certainly true that in those years 
important political developments of European integration occurred (such as the 1973 enlargement, the completion of the 
custom union, the establishment of the EMU in 1979). Moreover, the idea of stagnation implies a comparison with a 
standard of European integration that is purely ideal and politically questionable. However, as a matter of fact, at the 
time the perception of a political crisis of the Community project was widespread among the supporters of European 
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was frustrated by the development of the COREPER and by the incipient comitology15, the 
Luxembourg Compromise de facto abolished the majority-voting within the Council16, the 
European federalist movement remained marginal. The economic crisis following the oil shock of 
1973 were met by recourse to nationally oriented policies. In the public opinion of some Member 
States, the activity and prospects of the Community almost ceased to be topics of general interest. 
The word “supranational” was cancelled by the Merger Treaty (1965) and almost disappeared from 
the legal discourse on Europe17: “an era of Europessimism and Eurosclerosis, during which 
politicians and academics alike lost faith in European institutions”18. 
 
However, it was during that period that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) started to expresses an 
autonomous constitutional policy and to shape a federal-type structure for Europe. The ECJ was 
able to “constitutionalise” the EC Treaties precisely because it benefited from the “benign neglect 
of the power that be”, as Eric Stein famously put it19. The ECJ could draw advantage from the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
federalism; more important, it was widespread among the officials and technicians of the EC (see f.i. P. Reuter, Préface, 
in N. Condorelli Braun, Commissaires et juges dans les Communautés européennes, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1972). Thus, as 
J.H.H. Weiler correctly pointed out, the idea of stagnation may help to explain the judicial activism of the ECJ in the 
constitutionalisation phase. 
14
 J.P.J. White, Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission, in “Journal of 
European Integration History”, 9, 2003, pp. 111-131. See f.i. W. Hallstein, The EEC Commission: A New Factor in 
International Life, in “International and Comparative Law Quarterly”, 14, 1965. 
15
 On the role of the Coreper, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, in 
“Yearbook of European Law”, 1, 1981, pp. 267-306, pp. 285 ff.; Id., Il sistema comunitario europeo. Struttura giuridica 
e processo politico, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1985, pp. 81 ff.; J.W. Zwaan, The Permanent Representatives Committee. Its 
Role in European Union Decision-Making, Amsterdam et al., Elsevier, 1995, pp. 11 f. On comitology, see C. Neuhold, 
G.F. Schäfer, G. Haibach, A. Türk, T. Larsson, A. Maurer, Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in 
European Policy Making and Policy Implementation, Research Paper 00/GHA, Maastricht, 2000, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/548/01/main.pdf. Comitology has been regarded from the perspective of deliberative democracy: see 
C. Joerges, J. Neyer, Jürgen, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The 
Constitutionalisation of Comitology, in “European Law Journal”, 3, 1997, 273-299; the criticism of J.H.H. Weiler, 
Epilogue: “Comitology” as Revolution- Infranationalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, in C. Joerges and E. Vos 
(eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Oxford, Hart, 1999, pp. 339-350, p. 347, and others; the 
reply of C. Joerges, “Deliberative Supranationalism” – A Defence, EIoP 5/8, 2001, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-
008.htm (“comitology blurs the law/politics distinction through a ‘political administration’ that operates in the zones 
between normative/legal supranationalism and decisional/political intergovernmentalism. What is so bad about all 
this?”). See also E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum (eds.), Democracy in the EU – Integration Through Deliberation? London-
New York, Routledge, 2000; P.L. Linseth, ‘Weak’ Constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology and Transnational 
Governance in the European Union, in “Oxford Journal of Legal Studies”, 21, 2001, pp. 145-163, M.A. Pollack, 
Control Mechanism or Deliberative Democracy? Two Images of Comitology, in “Comparative Political Studies” 36, 
2003, pp. 125-133. 
16
 W. Nicoll, The Luxembourg Compromise, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 23, 1984, p. 35-43; A.L. 
Teasdale, The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise, in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 31, 1993, p. 
567-579. 
17
 On the decline of the concept, see f.i. P. Reuter, Organisations européennes, Paris, PUF, 1965, p. 31; A.M. Donner, 
The Role of the Lawyer in the European Communities, Edinburgh, Edinburgh UP, 1968, pp. 4. 
18
 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, cit., p. 314. See largely B. Olivi, Da un’Europa all’altra, Milano, Etas 
Kompass, 1973; Id., L’Europa difficile, cit. 
19
 E. Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, in “American Journal of International 
Law”, 75, 1981, pp. 1-27 
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“legislative gridlock” following the empty chair crisis20, from the self-interested unconcern of the 
national governments, from the cooperation of the national judiciaries21, and perhaps even from the 
absence of the citizen, from lack of public interest in Community affairs.  
 
The phase, covering the 1960s and 1970s, encompasses landmark decisions such as Van Gend en 
Loos (1963) and Costa (1964) (on EC law direct effect and supremacy), Stauder (1969), 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) and Nold (1974) (on EC law supremacy and on 
fundamental rights as general principles of EC law), Simmenthal (1978) (on the EC law direct effect 
and supremacy), Van Duyn (1974) and Ratti (1979) (on the direct effect of EC directives), “AETR” 
(1971) (on implied powers over external affairs and preemption of national law), Lütticke (1966), 
Hag (1974) and Centrafarm (1974), Defrenne (1976) and “Cassis de Dijon” (1979) (contributing to 
the setting-up of the common market). The phase embraces also the decisions of the national judges 
which gradually accepted the EC law claim to authority (with regard to primacy over national law: 
Belgian Cour de Cassation, Le Ski, 1971; BVerfGE 31, 145, Milchpulver, 1971; Italian Corte 
costituzionale, n. 183/1973, Frontini; French Cour de Cassation, Jacques Vabre, 1975).  
 
The importance of these decisions cannot be overstressed. It is the well-known story of judge-made 
constitutional law. Although in the national legal communities there had always been allegations of 
judicial activism, EC law scholars rightly celebrated the creation of a European “Community of 
law” (Walter Hallstein22), the judicial making of a “European Constitution”, the recognition of a 
higher law: a common rule of law among the European peoples (Carl Friedrich Ophüls, Antonio 
Trabucchi, Riccardo Monaco23).  
 
According to the ECJ Judge Pierre Pescatore, at the time the challenge was to create a 
“transnational judicial power”, and this was a matter of “judicial diplomacy”24. The initial emphasis 
on the Community separation and autonomy should be replaced with the objective and the practise 
                                                 
20
 G. Tsebelis, G. Garrett, The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the 
European Union, in “International Organization”, 55, 2001, pp. 357-390. 
21
 A.M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, Oxford, Hart 1998; K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy, cit. 
22
 See I. Pernice, Walter Hallstein: Erbe und Verpflichtung, Walter Hallstein-Institut Paper 7/2001, at http://www.whi-
berlin.de/alphabet. 
23
 C.F. Ophüls, Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans, in “Neue Juristische Wochenschrift”, 1951, pp. 289-292 
(Ambassador of Germany and Head of the German Delegations to the Committee Messina Conferences and Head of the 
German Delegation to the Messina Conference and to the Conference on the Common Market and Euratom); R. 
Monaco, Caratteri istituzionali della Comunità economica europea, in “Rivista di diritto internazionale”, 1958, pp. 9-
50 (Italian Judge of the ECJ 1964-1976); A. Trabucchi, Un nuovo diritto, in “Rivista di diritto civile”, 1963, I, pp. 259-
272 (Italian Judge of the ECJ, 1962-1972; General Advocate, 1973-1976). 
24
 P. Pescatore, L’integrazione europea: una nuova prospettiva per il potere giudiziario, in “Il Foro italiano”, 1975, V, 
cc. 105-113, c. 113. 
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of cooperation and integration. EC law scholars started to conceive the constitutionalization of the 
Treaties as the result of a “dialogue” between the ECJ and the national courts25.  
 
The preliminary ruling procedure offered a formal channel of dialogue, but also informal meetings 
between the judges, workshops, scientific conferences and reviews, which were necessary tools for 
the creation of a constitutional conversation among European jurists. That conversation took place 
in a sort of political vacuum – between the “benign neglect”, the “permissive consensus”26, the 
quiescence and ignorance of the public opinion. Thanks to the above-mentioned political vacuum, a 
purely legalistic grounding (“the spirit of the Treaty” in the 1960s and the recognition of 
“fundamental rights” in the 1970s) could suffice for providing an adequate legitimacy to the 
European constitutional process. However, behind the legalistic groundings of the “constituent” 
judicial decisions rested the practice of judicial dialogue, and behind the practice of the dialogue lay 
a considerable amount of institutional and scientific organization: the creation of a constitutional 
debate between the technicians of European integration.  
 
The deepening of European integration was not a matter of authority, which the ECJ lacked, but of 
mutual acknowledgment and cooperation between the ECJ and the national courts. The ECJ was in 
“seek for authority”27. The duty to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ could not effectively be 
enforced by the EC institutions, which had to rely upon the national courts’ spontaneous 
cooperation. Thus, the dialogue required trust and responsiveness on both sides. As envisaged by 
Deutsch, the establishment of a mutual transaction network, the creation of a sense of community-
belonging and of strong, lasting and deep social relationships within the EC28, if not neo-
functionalist shifting of “loyalties, expectations and political activities” toward the European 
level29, turned out to be a key policy issue. Trust-building became an object of governance. 
 
                                                 
25
 ECJ, Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the treaty on European Union, 
Luxembourg, May 1995: “The development of the Community legal order has been to a large extent the fruit of the 
dialogue which has built up between the national courts and the Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling 
procedure”. For some references from the legal doctrine of the 1970s, see below, and see G. Itzcovich, Teorie e 
ideologie, cit., pp. 407 ff. (ECJ judges and general advocates such as Martens de Wilmars, Pierre Pescatore, Maurice 
Lagrange, national judges, lawyers and academic jurists such as E. Cortese Riva Palazzi, P. Gori, M. Guadet). 
26
 L.N. Lindberg, S.A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community, 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1970. See A. Hurrelmann, European Democracy, the “Permissive Consensus” and the 
Collapse of the EU Constitution, in “European Law Journal”, 13/3, 2007, pp. 343-359 (“a situation in which the project 
of European integration was largely an elite affair that was, however, not in danger of being faced with widespread and 
focused popular opposition”); See L. Hooge, G. Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, in “British Journal of Political Science”, 39, 2008, 1-23. 
27
 C.J. Mann, The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1972. 
28
 K.W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1957 
29
 E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, cit., p. 16. 
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“Autonomous legal order”, “integration through law” and “Community of law” are some of the 
mottos of this constitutional phase30. The project of European integration had moved from the 
sphere of international diplomacy and organization to the technical domain of the EC law doctrine. 
It was the Golden Age of the jurists, and looking at their legal reasoning might prove helpful for 
approaching the constitutionalization process. The pooling of certain low-policy areas had 
engendered, if not Majone’s “regulative state”, at least the ECJ’s “new legal order” (Van Gend en 
Loos, 1963), and for EC jurists said legal order was formally independent from the Member States 
changing policies: they regarded it as “autonomous” from international law and from domestic law. 
The Community was an autonomous governance function, a “special purpose association of 
functional integration” (Zweckverbände funktioneller Integration)31, as the Treaties were full of 
teleology from top to bottom32. If the Community was not a federal state in the making33, it was at 
least an “administrative community” (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft)34, a “partial economic state” 
(Partieller Wirtschaftsstaat)35, a transnational “corps de métier”36, whereby sectional economic 
interests enjoyed self-government. 
 
The role of non-representative private and institutional actors in the constitutionalization process is 
indeed very important. Contemporary political science often stresses the role of the national courts, 
their interest to self-empowerment, and the role of private litigants, in order to explain 
constitutionalization in a time of political crisis of the European project37. Constitutionalization thus 
                                                 
30
 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. Weiler, Integration Through Law. Europe and the American Federal 
Experience, 5 voll., Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1985-1988. See, for instance, A. Trabucchi, Un nuovo diritto, cit.; 
W. Hallstein, Die europäische Gemeinschaft, Düsseldorf-Wien, Econ, 19732; P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration 
(Emergence of a new phenomenon in international relations, based on the experience of the European Communities), 
A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1974.  
31
 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen, Mohr, 1972, p. 196. 
32
 According to Judge Pierre Pescatore, the Treaties “are totally impregnated with teleology (…) the theleological 
method here is not merely a method of interpretation among others”: P. Pescatore, Les objectifs de la Communauté 
européenne comme principes d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice. Contribution a la doctrine 
de l’interprétation téléologique des traités internationaux, in Miscellanea W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Vol. II, 
Bruxelles-Paris, Bruylant-LGDJ, 1972, pp. 325-363, p. 327 f. 
33
 Federalism as dynamic tendency: amongst other, see P. Reuter, Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the European 
Regional Communities, in “Law and Contemporary Problems”, 26, 1961, pp. 381-399, p. 384; P. Hay, Federalism and 
Supranational Organizations. Patterns for new Legal Structures, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1966. 
34
 F.W. Jerusalem, Das Recht der Montanunion, Berlin-Frankfurt, Vahlen, 1954, p. 207; E.R. Huber, Deutsche 
Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1798, Vol. I, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln, Kohlhammer, 1957, p. 658, at note 2 
35
 H.-J. Schlochauer, Der übernationale Charakter der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, in “Juristen-
Zeitung”, 1951, p. 290. 
36
 F. Benvenuti, La C.E.C.A. ordinamento sovrano, in “Diritto internazionale”, 1961, p. 313 
37
 This is a thesis, amongst others, of A.-M. Slaughter and A. Stone Sweet. See f.i. W. Mattli, A.-M. Slaughter, 
Constructing The European Community Legal System From The Ground Up: The Role Of Individual Litigants And 
National Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 6/96, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9606ind.html; A. 
Stone Sweet, T.L. Brunell, The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary 
References, 1961-95, in “Journal of European Public Policy”, 5/1, 1998, pp. 66-97; A.M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court and National Courts, cit. See also H. Schepel, E. Blankenburg, Mobilizing 
the European Court of Justice, in G. De Búrca, J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice, Oxford, Oxford 
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appears to be the result of a “spill-over” dynamic between the courts, the academic jurists, the 
lawyers and their clients, i.e. the litigants – manly private companies and professionals. Public 
opinion has hardly played a role at all in the European constitutional process, should it be true that 
“to judge from contemporary newspapers the most serious question in the middle of that decade 
[the 1960s] for the future of a united Europe was the price of wheat”38. As Carl Schmitt put it, the 
EC had obtained an “effective political neutralization” of certain conflicts, regulative problems and 
decision-making procedures – “the attempt to realise the political union of Europe by means of 
neutralizations (so called integration)”39 – and, in some way, neofunctionalism proved to be a self-
fulfilling prophecy40. 
 
In this phase, we can individuate the some of first steps of “publicity” as governance function. The 
question on “who deliberates on what” gradually emerged as a crucial concern of European policy. 
The integration process was only able to advance to the extent that the Community was in a position 
to create public involvement and participation in its activities. At the beginning the scope of this 
“public” was indeed quite narrow, almost private: the “epistemic communities”41, and especially the 
jurists. The jurists became the target of a comprehensive set of initiatives aimed at creating 
information and discussion on EC law42. If the goal was to create a European “Community of law”, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
UP, 2001, pp. 9-42, spec. pp. 28 ff.; G. Tridimas, T. Tridimas, National Courts and European Court of Justice: A 
Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference Procedure, European Public Choice Society, 2002, 
http://polis.unipmn.it/epcs/papers/tridimas.pdf.  
38
 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, cit., p. 224. 
39
 C. Schmitt, added footnote to the 1963 edition of Begriff des Politishen, Italian translation in Id., Le categorie del 
“politico”, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972, pp. 177-180, note 4. 
40
 After the empty chair crisis, the founder of neo-functionalism, Ernst B. Haas, acknowledged that neo-functionalism 
had failed: European integration was a highly sensitive political dynamic and it did not result from an automatic process 
driven by the incremental logic of the market stakeholders and the public administrators. See E.B. Haas, Preface to The 
Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1957-1957, Stanford, Stanford UP, 19682 (on the importance 
of purely political factors); E.B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory, Berkeley, Institute of 
International Studies, 1975. His self-criticisms were excessive and the following years showed that the basic thesis of 
neo-functionalism was substantially correct: see J. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A 
Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC, in “Millennium - Journal of International Studies”, 20/1, 
1991, pp. 1-22, p. 19 (“The obstinacy of the logic of spill-over implies that neofunctionalism is by no means obsolete”); 
B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Houndmills, Macmillan, 2000, p. 100 (“What was clear, though, was 
that [Haas’] idea of neofunctionalism as obsolescent was something of an exaggeration”). On neofunctionalism and 
“politicization” see L. Hooghe, G. Marks, The Neofunctionalist Were (almost) Right: Politicization and European 
Integration, ConWEB No. 5/2005, http://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/conweb/p0024.html.. 
41
 P.M. Haas, Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination, in “International 
Organisation”, XLVI/1, 1992. 
42
 For references to institutional initiatives of this sort, see G. Itzcovich, Teorie e ideologie, cit., pp. 305 f. See also H.G. 
Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration, in “American Journal of International 
Law”, 68, 1974, p. 448; H.G. Schermers, D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, The Hague, 
Kluwer, 20016 , pp. 228-229; H. Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice, Copenhagen, GadJura, 1998, p. 118. 
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then a European community of lawyers had to be constructed43. European law discovered 
communication as a problem and as a resource. 
 
 
4. The semi-permanent treaty revision process 
 
All periodisations are affected by a certain degree of arbitrariness; the boundaries of every phase 
may be uncertain and questionable. The second European constitutional process is marked by the 
political crisis of the European project, but when did such crisis start? In 1964-65, with De Gaulle, 
the empty chair crisis and the Luxembourg compromise, or back in 1954, with the failure of the 
EDC and the decline of the federalist impulse of the post-war? The second European constitutional 
process is also marked by the Treaties constitutionalization, which clearly begun in 1963-1964 
(ECJ, Van Gend en Loss and Costa), but when did it stop? There may be good reasons for believing 
that the ECJ has been less activist in the 1980s and 1990s44 – the Foglia-Novello cases in 1980-81 
already marked a watershed45 – but there is no reason for believing that the ECJ and the “judicial 
construction of Europe” have stopped being important. In any case, no clear finishing point can be 
attributed to the second phase, inasmuch as we characterize it for being technocratic: probably it is 
still going on, as the role of technical expertise and epistemic communities has never stopped being 
crucial. 
 
Nor can clear-cut contours be attributed to the third phase: a phase of apparent revival in the 
European integration beginning in the mid 1980s. If we decide to focus on the development of the 
European economic constitution, then the most important steps can be found in the ECJ “Cassis de 
Dijon” ruling of the 197946, in the 1985 White Paper on completing the internal market from the 
Delors Commission47, in the Single European Act (1986) and, most importantly, in the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992). Alternatively, if we decide to focus on the constitutional process’ institutional 
                                                 
43
 H. Schepel, R. Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe, in 
“European Law Journal”, 1997, pp. 165-188. 
44
 G.F., Mancini, Attivismo e autocontrollo nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, in “Rivista di diritto europeo”, 
1990, pp. 229-240. 
45
 ECJ, 11.03.1980, C-104/79, Foglia c. Novello I and 16.12.1981, C-244/80, Foglia c. Novello II, in Racc., p. 3045. 
See A. Barav, Preliminary Censorship? The Judgment of the Court in Foglia v. Novello, in “European Law Rreview”, 
4, 1980, pp. 443; D. Wyatt, Following up Foglia: Why the Court is Right to Stick to its Guns, in “European Law 
Rreview”6, 1981, pp. 447 ff.; A. Tizzano, Foglia-Novello atto II, ovvero la crisi dell’ “uso alternativo” dell’art. 177 
CEE, in “Foro Italiano”, 1982, IV, cc. 308-315; A. Barav, Imbroglio préjudiciel. A propos des arrêts de la Cour de 
justice dans l’affaire Costa C. Novello, in “Revue trimestrielle de droit européen”, 1982, 431-483. 
46
 ECJ, 20.02.1979, C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG (“Cassis de Dijon”). The Court paved the way to the White Paper on 
completing the internal market. 
47
 White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Completing the Internal Market, Milan, 28-29 June 
1985. COM (85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. 
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aspects, then we must look at the series of Treaties revisions (SEA 1986, Maastricht 1992, 
Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2001, failed Constitutional Treaty 2004, Lisbon 2007), and we may well 
speak of a “semi-permanent Treaty revision process” ongoing since 1986: according to De Witte, 
this is the “golden age of European Treaty revision” and “the closest thing to a constitutional 
conversation in Europe”48. However, having regard to the changes occurred in the constitutional 
process after Nice (§ 5.), we may conventionally identify the third phase with the period dated 1985 
to 2000.  
 
If we look at the economic constitution of Europe, we may note that within the “ordo-liberal” 
melange of the old EC49, the liberal ingredient became more prominent in the 1980s and eventually 
produced far-ranging institutional developments with the Single European Act and the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The neo-liberal turn occurred in the 1980s and the end of the cold war provided massive 
constitutional change in the EC/EU: a third “constituent process”, after the foundation of the 
Community and the Treaties constitutionalization. The “formal constitution” developed by the ECJ 
in the second phase (direct effect, supremacy, etc.) was to be filled with substantive contents, new 
policy choices and legal principles of the market economy. The scope of Community action grew 
enormously. The EEC stopped being essentially the custom union of partially integrated national 
markets, with narrow regulatory powers firmly retained by the national governments acting in the 
Council of Ministers. The completion of the internal market required market deregulation (the 
general principle of “mutual recognition”), but it also required new regulation (harmonization and 
the adoption of common standards), and therefore profound institutional reforms and enhanced 
political cooperation among the Member States50.  
 
The semi-permanent treaty revision process not only completed the economic constitution of 
Europe, but it also produced great institutional reforms. There was no single recognizable 
constituent event, but an ongoing constitution-building process: the EC/EU enlargement to new 
Member States, extensions of qualified majority voting to prevent the risk of legislative gridlock, 
strengthening of the Parliament’s constitutional role (cooperation procedure, codecision procedure, 
new procedure for the appointment of the President of the Commission), broadening of EC 
                                                 
48
 B. de Witte, The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision 
Process, in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, 
Oxford, Hart, 2002, pp. 39-57; B. de Witte, Treaty Revision in the European Union: Constitutional Change through 
International Law, in “Netherlands Yearbook of International Law”, 35, 2004, pp. 51-85, p. 59. 
49
 See C. Joerges, “Economic order” – “technical realization” – “the hour of the executive”: some legal historical 
observations on the Commission White Paper on European governance, Jean Monnet Working Paper  
No.6/01, Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012201.html. 
50
 B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Houndmills, Macmillan, 2000, pp. 98 ff. 
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legislation to new areas and establishment of the “two pillars” of intergovernmental cooperation; 
generally speaking, increased complexity of European governance and multiplication of decision-
making procedures aimed at granting flexibility to the political process. 
 
After Maastricht, the debate on the legal nature of the Community/Union, which had almost ceased 
during the 1970s, started again and became widespread not only among the jurists, but also among 
the legal theorists, political scientists and international relations theorists. Paradoxical as it may 
seem, the new debate generally reached the same conclusion of the old one: the EU was a “sui 
generis” entity – not a federal state, nor an international organization. From the viewpoint of 
constitutional law theory the conclusion was disappointing and, at the same time, exciting. It meant 
that the Community continued to escape the incontrovertible distinctions between confederation and 
federation, between international law and constitutional law, between international arena and 
domestic polity, between external and internal domain. The Community had not ceased to put in 
crisis some core distinctions of modern political and legal thought: the distinction between 
internal/external (international law/domestic law, foreign affairs/home affairs) as well as the 
distinction between public/private (state/civil society, politics/economy).  
 
Multilevel governance and legal pluralism became key-concepts for describing the post-modern 
constitution of Europe51. Europe is now conceived of as a political and legal community of a new 
kind, which lacks a single and clearly established centre of authority. Governance differs from 
government, as government implies hierarchical decision-making structures and the centrality of 
public actors, while governance refers to non-hierarchical form of decision-making involving the 
participation of both public and private actors52. The EU is regarded as a political system in which 
binding decisions result from a complex web of interaction by territorially and functionally 
differentiated players, without a single unifying centre53. “Instead of being explicitly challenged, 
states in the EU are being melded gently into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of 
numerous sub-national and supranational actors”54. The decision-making process occurring at 
European level cannot be explained in isolation from the domestic decision-making processes, and 
vice versa: the EU and the Member States cannot be opposed as unrelated legal and political 
subjects, and nonetheless they enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and separateness. Therefore, they 
                                                 
51
 See M. Barberis, L’Europa del diritto, cit., pp. 256 ff. 
52
 B. Kohler-Koch, B. Rittberger, Review Article: The “Governance Turn” in EU Studies, in “Journal of Common 
Market Studies”, 44, 2006, 27-49. 
53
 T. Diez, Europe as a Discursive Battleground. Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies, in 
“Cooperation & Conflict”, 36/1, 2001, pp. 5-38, p. 10. 
54
 G. Marks, L. Hooghe, K. Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric versus Multi-Level Government, 
in “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 34/3, 1995, pp. 341–378. 
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may occasionally come into conflict with one another. An ongoing interaction among institutions 
endowed with different legitimacies takes place, and no conclusive authority is established to decide 
on the potential conflicts.  
 
From a legal point of view, the essential feature of a multilevel polity is that the legitimacy of the 
various level of government is not derived from one another55. This is the fundamental theoretical 
assumption of legal pluralism. According to legal pluralism, within the European polity a definite 
“rule of recognition” is absent or disputed, or there are several conflicting rules of recognition and 
no well-established authority to rule on the matter56. By holding that the legal orders may overlap 
and conflict with each other, legal pluralism marks a break with the tradition. Traditionally, legal 
orders are conceived as self-contained sets of legal rules, and accordingly as unifying reference 
points of all operations of the legal system. In the event that, as pluralism maintains, the legal orders 
enter into conflict with each other and in the absence of a meta-legal order to rule on the case, then 
the authority deciding on the conflict necessarily belongs to one of the conflicting legal order. 
Consequently, it enjoys only a partial authority, it is a “semi-authority”; the “deciding” authority 
may not be “decisive” from the perspective of both legal order.  
 
In a pluralist legal space, the legal orders cease to be the unifying reference point of the legal 
reasoning, the sole and exclusive ground for the decision. The self-contained “legal orders” melt 
into a generic “legal space”57, or “legal dis-order”58. The Grundnorm stops being an easily available 
epistemological presupposition, a useful working hypothesis of the jurists, as it turns out to be the 
object of recurring controversies upon which the courts are called to adjudicate. A purely legalistic 
grounding of the decision becomes insufficient, precisely because it is increasingly perceived as 
                                                 
55
 I. Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?, in 
“Common Market Law Review”, 36, 1999, pp. 703-750, 709. 
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Movement, in “European Law Journal”, 14/4, 2008, 389-422; A.J. Menéndez, Is European Union Law a Pluralist Legal 
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MacCormick’s Theory of Law, Oslo, ARENA, 2008, 233-314; special issue of the “International Journal of 
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 C. Harding, The Identity of European Law: Mapping Out the European Legal Space, in “European Law Journal”, 6/2, 
2000, 128-147; S. Cassese, Lo spazio giuridico globale, Roma, Laterza, 2003. 
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 G. Itzcovich, Integrazione giuridica. Un’analisi concettuale, in “Diritto pubblico”, 3, 2005, pp. 749-786, spec. pp. 
781 ss.; N. Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders, in 
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“legalistic” – insensitive, rigid, insincere. In the legal reasoning, rights talk and the reference to 
constitutional principles grew more and more important. Rights and principles can be perceived as 
being both fundamental and common: a polycentric network of legal principles rather then the 
unavoidably exclusive legal order’s normative hierarchies. The discourse on fundamental rights 
provide a supplément d’âme (“a supplementary soul”)59 to the lacking sovereignty of an evanescent 
and fluid political community. Neo-constitutionalism became a common legal language60, and 
“publicity”, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, escaped from the closed doors sessions of 
the courts and of the intergovernmental conferences and started to address the general public.  
 
 
5. The constitutional debate and débâcle 
 
Join a Debate-marathon that runs all over Europe! The Debating Workshop and Tournament provide you with an 
opportunity to improve your skills in public speaking and to learn about the future of Europe! This event combines 
experienced trainers, excellent speakers and heated political debates, so prepare to have great fun! 
“Universities to Debate Europe”, UniDebate in Helsinki 16-17 Nov 2002 
 
The conclusions of the renewed debate on the EU legal nature, with pluralism and multilevel 
governance emerging as predominant theoretical approaches (§ 4.), hint at a legitimacy deficit of 
the EU61. We may hold that in multilevel governance, in a pluralist legal space, the legitimacy 
deficit is, so to say, structural. As a Carl Schmitt’s reader and early EC law scholar once wrote with 
regard to the EEC, “we practically observe the existence of a latent sovereignty in search of a 
political guarantor”62. The EU is not a state: it is not a sovereign authority upon one people and one 
territory. The EU does not have a coercive apparatus designed to enforce its decisions, nor does it 
possess an autonomous social basis. Therefore, the EU cannot simply presuppose the validity and 
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the effectiveness of its own norms: it must win its authority in concurrence and cooperation with 
other bodies – the governments of the Member States, the domestic courts, and eventually the 
public opinion63.  
 
I will argue that such structural legitimacy deficit might well prove to be a political opportunity (§ 
8.). However, it must be stressed that the EU adds to the many facets of its structural legitimacy 
deficit (democratic deficit, constitutional deficit, etc.) a social deficit which is strongly contingent 
upon its history, and profoundly rooted in its economic constitution and institutional design64. Such 
legitimacy deficit may be politically expensive in terms of good governance and social cohesion. 
Moreover, after the Maastricht Treaty, European integration became increasingly politically 
controversial, as it is demonstrated by the Maastricht-Urteil of the German Constitutional Court, by 
the initial Danish no-vote to Maastricht, by the very close referendum in France, and by the 
problems which ratification caused to the government in the UK. As Gráinne de Búrca observes, “it 
is largely since the Maastricht process that the debate on the European Union has been in terms of a 
‘crisis’ of legitimacy”65. 
 
The fourth and last constitutional process of the EU – the “constitutional debate”, or “debate on the 
future of Europe – arises to address the legitimacy issue: to bring Europe closer to its citizens. In 
order to improve the scope and efficiency of the EU action, the decision-making process must 
achieve greater accountability, transparency, openness and public visibility. Democratising was the 
tool for strengthening the authority, political influence and popular support of the EU.  
 
The main events of the phase can be briefly summarized as follows. The Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the Treaty of Nice did not resolve the institutional problems linked to the incumbent massive 
enlargement of the EU to the Central and Eastern European countries. The poor outcomes of the 
Treaty of Nice, which was essentially devoted to the “left-overs” of Amsterdam, marked the 
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finishing point of the third constitutional phase of European integration. The Treaty made some 
minor adjustments to the function and composition of the institutions and made the enhanced 
cooperation system more flexible. But the Treaty of Nice failed to deal with the basic question of 
wide-ranging institutional reform.  
 
Moreover, the “constitutional conversation” occurring between the heads of state and government at 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) proved to be a petty and short-sighted bargaining on 
institutional issues. The IGC model encountered increasing criticism. “Apparently, an 
intergovernmental conference is not the best forum for elaborating coherent solutions to complex 
institutional problems”66; the IGC “unhappily combines a narrow consultative base, a protracted 
timescale and a procedure which encourages negative criticism rather than constructive debate”67. 
Many thought that the time had arrived for a genuine constitutional momentum68: European 
integration should be brought a step further, and the well-established “economic union” should 
develop towards a true “political union”69, by strengthening the external and internal powers of the 
EU, merging the three pillars into one unit, and, above all, by engaging in a comprehensive 
institutional reform, aimed at achieving more transparency, democratic accountability and 
efficiency of the decision-making procedures. According to Jo Shaw, the “image of the 
‘constitutionalised treaty’ [could not] – if it ever could – any longer sustain the EU as constitutional 
legal order”, and the bridging of the “legitimacy gap” would have “inevitably involve[ed] the 
replacement, or at least the supplementation, of the traditional mode of treaty-making behind closed 
doors”70. 
 
In response to these shortcomings, criticisms and proposals, the Final Act of the Treaty of Nice 
contained a declaration of the heads of state and government launching another ICG conference for 
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treaty revision in 200471. One year later, the European Council, meeting in Laeken, adopted a 
Declaration on the Future of the EU, committing the UE to becoming more democratic, transparent 
and effective, and calling for a debate on the constitutional reform issues. The European Council set 
up a Convention bringing together representatives of the national parliaments, the Member States, 
the European Parliament, and the Commission72. The “Convention method”, already adopted in 
1999-2000 for the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, was embraced “in order to 
pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible”73. The 
logic of narrowly self-interested governmental bargaining and shady backroom deals should be 
replaced, or at least complemented, by a more dialogic approach to constitution-making: an open, 
inclusive and relatively unconstrained deliberation on the “future of Europe” taking place in the 
Convention and in the public at large.  
 
With the Laeken Declaration and the establishment of the Convention begins the fourth and last 
constitutional phase: the “debate on the future of Europe”, or constitutional debate. As it is well 
known, the Convention concluded its works in 2003 and proposed a draft-treaty, the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe74. The heads of state and government introduced minor 
changes and the Treaty was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004.  
 
There would be no point here in providing an account, let alone a detailed account, of the 
Constitutional Treaty, as it has been largely discussed and commented by jurists, political scientists 
and publicists75. Obviously, different evaluations were made, and the Treaty met the support and the 
criticism of many. One issue, however, is pretty clear, generally admitted and of great interest as far 
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as the relationship between constitutional reform process and communication policy (“publicity”) is 
concerned. It has been expressed in an advisory opinion of the Dutch Council of State: 
 
Although it was the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that first gathered together these basic rules 
and principles in a treaty-based written constitution, its content was largely a codification (or recodification) of 
the existing treaties and case law; only a small number of its provisions were actually new. These provisions 
were partly prompted by dissatisfaction with the functioning of the EU, and were designed to improve it. 
However, the main difference between the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the earlier 
amending treaties, such as the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, lay not so much in its content as in 
the constitutional symbolism that it was meant to convey, with a strong emphasis on democracy and 
fundamental rights, and hence on European citizenship76. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty brought massive institutional reforms, but it did not make tabula rasa. In 
comparison with the Treaty of Maastricht and even with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Constitutional Treaty did not increase significantly the scope of the EU competences. Moreover, the 
present Union’s definition of its socio-economic model was left untouched, or perhaps it was even 
reinforced by the references to “free and undistorted” competition in the internal market (dropped 
by the Lisbon Treaty), “price stability” and “highly competitive social market economy” as general 
objectives of the European Union. The outcomes of the Constitutional Treaty were insufficient to 
justify the constitutional rhetoric, although the Treaty introduced important innovations to the 
organisation of the EU, which the Lisbon Treaty has generally preserved. The main novelty brought 
in by the Constitutional Treaty, and abandoned by the Lisbon Treaty, was precisely that 
constitutional symbolism, rhetoric and publicity. 
 
On 29 May 2005 the French referendum rejected the Treaty by a margin of 55% to 45%, and so did 
the Dutch consultative referendum three days later by a margin of 61% to 39%77. The European 
Council meeting in June 2005 called for a “period of reflection” during which, obviously, a “broad 
debate” should have taken place in each country “involving citizens, civil society, social partners, 
national parliaments and political parties”78. At the end of the period of reflection, the European 
Council meeting in June 2007 declared the Constitutional Treaty defunct, and asked the IGC to 
draw up a new treaty. The European Council gave strict and extremely detailed instructions on the 
content of the forthcoming treaty. With regard to publicity, the European Council requested that 
IGC abandon the constitutional paraphernalia: the “constitutional concept”, the denomination 
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“law”, the flag, the anthem and the motto, all symbols and terminologies usually associated with 
political identity and statehood79.  
 
The IGC reached political agreement on the text, and the Treaty was signed in Lisbon on 13 
December 200780. It was subsequently approved by the parliaments of all Member States by large 
majorities and even by unanimity (Italy, Malta and the German Bundesrat). The majoritarian 
political parties were united in their desire to make it sure that the Lisbon Treaty went into force, 
because most of its provisions were vital for the ordinary functioning of an enlarged EU. In Poland 
and in the Czech Republic the Treaty received the approvals from the parliaments, but the heads of 
state opposed the Treaty and have yet to give their final signature81. No popular referendum was 
held in any Member State, with the exception of Ireland, which rejected the Treaty by a margin of 
53.4% to 46.6%. The Irish government considers holding revote in June 2009. Thus, the Lisbon 
Treaty could not enter into force on the announced date of 1 January 2009. 
 
 
6. Publicity in practise. A short history 
 
The social as a script, whose bewildered audience we are 
J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation 
 
The main goal of the constitutional debate was the reduction of the legitimacy deficit: as the heads 
of state and government declared at Laeken, one of the “basic challenges” to be resolved was “how 
to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European 
institutions”. However, the idea of bringing the citizen closer to the EU by creating discussion, 
participation and trust was not entirely new. Indeed, one may cogently argue that the main function 
of the European Parliament has been to perform this kind of function – creating publicity, “rousing 
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the European public opinion”82. Moreover, as we have seen previously (§ 3.), that the practice of 
“bringing the jurists closer to the ECJ” was a major concern of the Commission and the ECJ already 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
At the time, the European communication policy83 was mainly focused on the national judiciaries. 
However, already in this phase the project of bringing Europe closer to someone begun to address 
the general public. As the first step for getting closer to the citizen is to see what the citizen thinks 
about Europe, the creation of Eurobarometer in 1973 can be mentioned, although it still represents a 
“passive” stage of publicity. Active citizenship-building had become a conscious policy objective 
since the Copenhagen Summit in 1973. The heads of state and government issued a Declaration on 
the European Identity, according to which the “defining the European Identity” involved “taking 
into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification” and “reviewing the common 
heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine”. The Declaration provided some guidelines 
for developing the “special rights” of the European citizen, and one year later, at the Paris Summit 
of December 1974, the heads of state and government established a working group, lead by Leo 
Tindemans, to study the issue of the special rights and the issue of the European passport. The 1975 
Commission report “Toward European Citizenship” strongly favoured the introduction of a 
European passport and argued, among other things, that “such a passport would have [had] a 
psychological effect, one which would [have] emphasize[d] the feeling of nationals of the nine 
Member States of belonging to the Community”84. The Tindemans report, released in 1975, 
included a chapter on “People’s Europe” and, as far as I know, it coined the motto “Europe must be 
close to its citizens”85. 
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After the disappointingly low turnout in the 1984 European Parliament elections, the European 
Council meeting at Fontainebleau considered “it essential that the Community should respond to the 
expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity 
and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world”86. Therefore, the European Council 
set up an ad hoc committee for a “People’s Europe” – the Adonnino Committee. The report of the 
Committee called for action in the areas of culture and communication: “It is also through action in 
the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the 
Community’s image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and 
must be sought”87. According to the report, a wide range of initiatives should have targeted the 
“minds of European people”, such as, amongst other things, the organizing a “Euro-lottery”: “to 
make Europe come alive for Europeans, an event with popular appeal could help promote the 
European idea”88. 
 
One of the aspirations of the Treaty of Maastricht was to make European institution closer to the 
citizen: the Member States were “resoled to continue the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen” 
(Preamble of the TEU). The Treaty of Maastricht performed some kind of constitutional maquilage, 
such as changing the name of the European Economic Community to simply “European 
Community” and introducing a section on citizenship in the EC Treaty. The European citizenship 
has always been totally dependent upon national citizenship and almost void of any normative 
content – little more than the right to petition the Ombudsman and to vote in elections to the 
European Parliament. However, the introduction of citizenship succeeded in generating political 
rhetoric and academic debate, and the studies on European citizenship generally reinforced the 
“normative turn” of contemporary political philosophy and political sciences89. Participation to the 
public sphere, belongingness in the political community, which once were the premises of citizen’s 
rights, became the objective of the codification of the citizen’s rights: bringing the citizens closer to 
the EU by making them aware of the rights they already have.  
 
The idea of bringing the citizens closer to the European Union was also at the basis of the drafting 
of a “showcase ‘Charter of Rights’” in Nice90. As Rubio Llorente writes, the Charter’s goal was “to 
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help us to appreciate the rights that the legal order of the European Union has guaranteed for years”; 
the Charter had a “pedagogical and, in a certain sense, propagandistic purpose”91. Rather than 
creating new rights, the Charter reaffirmed existing rights as they resulted from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States, international instruments such as the ECHR, and the ECJ case law. 
Its innovative effect, if any, was almost insignificant. Moreover, the provisions set out in the last 
chapter of the Charter were designed to make it sure that the Charter could have no effect on the 
legal orders of the Member States and on the vertical distribution of competences. Due to drafting 
deficiencies, the Charter might even have threatened the supremacy of EC law over national law92. 
In comparison with the ECJ’s settled case-law, the Charter unintentionally narrowed the scope of 
fundamental rights protection in EC law93. Nonetheless, the Member States gathered in Nice were 
not “courageous” enough to incorporate the Charter into the EU primary law. Thus, the Charter 
remained a political declaration and a source of soft law. Especially in the United Kingdom, the 
constitutional publicity of the Charter, by raising identity-based concerns, might have had 
destabilising effects on the domestic European policy. The Constitutional Treaty incorporated the 
Charter, and the Lisbon Treaty reached the same practical effect by means of a short cross-
reference (renvoi). The United Kingdom and Poland opted out. In 2007 the Member States, in the 
effort of saving the constitutional reform process from the pernicious effects of this useless Charter, 
introduced a dangerous distinction between “rights” and “principles”, the latter being not “judicially 
cognisable”.  
 
The Charter unintentionally provided both bad law and bad politics. European constitutional law 
tends to become extremely “soft”, almost impalpable, in order to avoid being politically 
unacceptable at the national level. But soft law, for its being non-binding, requires publicity in order 
to be effective, and thus it might well be intrusive, irritating and distortive for the public opinion 
and the political process.  
 
The main achievement, and eventually the most apparent failure of European constitutional 
publicity is represented by the Convention, the Constitutional Treaty and the wide range of 
institutional initiatives and official documents aimed at sustaining the public debate in Europe. 
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Among the latter, the most original and imaginative Commission Plan D for democracy, dialogue 
and debate94 and the White Paper on a European Communication Policy shall be mentioned95. In 
order to strengthen and stimulate dialogue, public debate and citizen participation during the period 
of reflection (“a wide-ranging discussion on the European Union – what it is for, where it is going 
and what it should be doing”), the Plan D proposed several EU initiatives and actions – the 
assistance to the Member States in the organisation of national debates, the visits by Commissioners 
to Member States, the European Round Table for Democracy and the European Goodwill 
Ambassadors. The White Paper on Communication Policy proposed “a forward-looking agenda for 
better communication to enhance the public debate in Europe”. The proposals ranged from adopting 
a “European Charter on Communication”, to “empowering the citizens” by “improving civic 
education”, working with the media and new technologies in order to give “Europe a human face”, 
“understanding European public opinion” by setting up a special series of Eurobarometer polls, a 
network of experts in public opinion research, an observatory for European public opinion, and,  
most importantly, “doing job together”, i.e. involving the Member States, other EU institution, the 
political parties, the NGOs, etc., in the creation of “a robust European debate”. 
 
The purport of the Convention was to broaden participation in the “constitutional conversation” and 
to promote public discussion on the institutional reform process. Some of the issues actually under 
discussion were highly technical and politically sensitive (the voting procedures and the 
composition of the institutions, the distribution of competences, the simplification of the treaties, 
the review of the division into three pillars, the establishment of a normative hierarchy, the 
inclusion of the Charter), and a democratic public debate on these issues was highly improbable. 
Moreover, the Convention urged the European people to debate on the establishment of a European 
Constitution which was already largely in place and functioning, and on the contents of the legally 
irrelevant Preamble. A wide-ranging and open discussion on the adoption of the idols of modern 
politics, the relicts of the age of the nation states, such as flag, anthem and motto, should have 
begun96. The general public should not have remained the “ghost at the IGC table”97, as it has 
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always been: it should have been brought at the centre of the stage, under the spotlights of the 
publicity.  
 
Unfortunately, the public revealed to be ghostly98 – spectral, uncanny, and indistinct, almost 
unintelligible, and nonetheless hostile to the constitutional publicity. The debate on the future of 
Europe proved to be the last concretisation of the “Euro-lottery” stream of European polity-
building, and the bet was lost. It comes to no surprise that the Lisbon Treaty is almost the 
institutional photocopy of the Constitutional Treaty, out of all constitutional “pathos and patina”99. 
“In a purely legal reading, the difference between the two Treaties is lost or made a matter of 
cosmetics”100. Nor is it surprisingly that the evanescent public is urged to vote and vote again, until 
it gets it right, by learning and accepting, as it was done in Denmark and Ireland101, or until the 
public disappears, as it has almost happened for the elections of the European Parliament. For the 
first time in their history, the Dutch, one of the most pro-European peoples of the EU, were called 
to vote on a consultative referendum and they voted in mass against the Constitutional Treaty. 
There will not be another Dutch referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Obviously, the results of the referendums cannot be attributed to one single explanation alone. No 
clear unequivocal question was formulated in the referendums, no informed and reasonable choice 
could be made. Being almost politically unintelligible, the results of the referendums are also of 
little political relevance – they do not provide the decision-makers with a clear course of action. To 
put it bluntly, the citizen’s response to the constitutional referendums cannot but be “ignorant, 
irrelevant and ideological”102. Baudrillard was right in believing that the reforms foreseen in the 
Treaties eventually would have been adopted, no matter the results of the referendums: “The vote is 
fixed. If the ‘no’ side wins the day this time, they will make us vote again (as in Denmark and 
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Ireland) until the ‘yes’ wins. We may as well vote yes right now”103. The major political parties, the 
quality press and the opinion makers agreed on the “yes” – “progressive Europeanism became the 
general code of conduct for political actors to appear in the media”104. The referendums appeared as 
pure means of legitimisation that the politicians were using to promote their own views. They had 
already decided, and thus the “no” at the referendum “was not a no to Europe, but a no to the 
unquestionable yes”105. 
 
Surely governance is a matter of learning, adaptation, and communication. But if the goal of the 
debate on the future of Europe was to democratise the EU, to “bring the citizens closer to the EU” 
and to “empower the citizen”, then the constitutional process utterly failed.  
 
 
 
7. Publicity in theory. The concept 
 
The quest for “universals of communication” ought to make us shudder 
G. Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control 
 
According to Chris Shore, at the turn of the 1990s the “emphasis on consciousness-raising as a 
strategy for bringing Europe ‘closer to its citizens’ and creating ‘Europeans’ signalled a new 
departure in EU approaches to the neglected domain of culture”106. However, already during the 
constitutionalisation phase, in the ECJ and the Legal Services of the Commission, a new way of 
“interact[ing] with the public, secur[ing] professional expertise and expo[ing] the interest 
definitions of private actors” was taking shape: a new approach that “no longer [had] much in 
common with the way that traditional bureaucracies [had] defined their relationship with the 
public”107. Communication became the object of a distinctive policy aimed at catalysing the “public 
sphere” and fostering public debate: what I call “publicity”108 – both in the sense of creation of 
Öffentlichkeit, public discussion, openness and transparency, and in the sense of advertisement, 
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consensus-building, agenda-setting strategy. In the constitutional debate, I have argued, 
constitutional publicity boomed and eventually failed.  
 
One may wonder if there is really something new going on. After all, publicity may not be a new 
governance function, it may well be only the last example of other well-known political processes 
and power relationships: nation-building, gouvernementalité and discipline109. Indeed, “creating 
allegiance has been an unremitting effort by the nation-state since its origins”110. The sense of 
belonging to a community fosters an attitude of prompt compliance and lies at the basis of 
legitimacy. In the case of nation states, such belongingness is by no means a pre-political bond 
emerging spontaneously from social cooperation. Nationalism has been artificially created by the 
state, which eradicated the local cultures, transformed the way of life of the communities, set up 
national myths, official national history, a public education system, army and banners of allegiance 
such as flags, anthems and nationalistic rhetoric. In the case of Italy, the patriot and statesman 
Massimo D’Azeglio famously said, after the unification in 1861, “Italy is made, we must make the 
Italians”; the first world war, the invention of the radio and later the invention of the television were 
crucial events in the shaping of the Italian identity and language. Identity-building was a conscious 
objective of public policies affecting new governance areas, such as the national education system.  
 
However, there is something new in the contemporary European publicity, something that makes it 
quite different from the nation-building experience in Europe. Publicity is a distinctive way of 
managing political communication. Publicity promotes discussion in order to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the decisions to be taken. Publicity aims at catalysing the “public sphere”, 
encouraging debate and discussion, in the effort of building consensus on the outcomes of the 
political process, enhancing the authority of a governance agency, creating allegiance to a political 
community in the making. The new European identity-building process is not primarily based on 
coercion, but on publicity.  
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Truly enough, the project of bringing Europe “closer to the citizens” bears some uncanny similarity 
with the idea of bringing the citizens “closer to the power” at the core of the old-fashioned political 
propaganda. Both publicity and propaganda are the object of public policies and operate with 
communication and not with coercion. But propaganda aims at destroying the public opinion, while 
publicity, even when it fails, aims at creating it. Publicity may be intrusive, but it is not a violent 
and destructive intervention on the general political communication. Publicity is a communicative 
proposal requiring attention, not a unified system of beliefs requiring acceptance. It aims at creating 
public concern and interest, not obedience. Publicity is one possible response to the legitimacy 
deficit which affects the multilevel governance agencies. “Publicitarian” consensus is the premise 
of voluntary acceptance and compliance.  
 
Most importantly, propaganda is a manifestation of political sovereignty and cultural hegemony. It 
conveys a message embodied in social movements, political parties, mass organisations, and 
everyday conversations: the message is invariably already present in the community addressed by 
propaganda, it is deeply rooted in the social spheres that propaganda colonises and corrupts. 
Although it might be seen as an expression of the regime’s weakness, propaganda as such consists 
in the exercise of power and strength. On the contrary, publicity is an expression of weakness and 
lack of authority. There is no political sovereignty behind publicity, there is just the “autonomy” of 
a set of agencies, institutions and processes. There is no hegemony behind the message conveyed by 
publicity, but simply lack of interest, unconcern, unawareness. 
 
Publicity is distinct from propaganda but both have in common the fact of being vertical, top-down 
forms of political communication: both contribute to the “inner colonisation of the Lebenswelt”, as 
Habermas would say, endanger the autonomy of the civil society, corrupt the “general intellect”. 
Publicity may well create public opinion and consensus, when it succeeds, but it impoverishes the 
public sphere and hinders political innovation. The ultimate end of publicity might be the catatonic 
stupor of the consumer-spectator-citizen.  
 
The project of bringing Europe closer to the citizens bears some uncanny similarity not only with 
the idea of propaganda – bringing the citizen “closer to the power” – but also with the idea of 
bringing a (political) good closer to its customers (citizens), that is at the core of marketing: “the 
selling of Europe”111. Indeed, publicity is much more similar to advertisement than to political 
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propaganda, and historically the practise of publicity arose from the ground of corporate governance 
and public relations112. As Baudrillard writes, 
 
It is not by chance that advertising, after having, for a long time, carried an implicit ultimatum of an economic 
kind, fundamentally saying and repeating incessantly, "I buy, I consume, I take pleasure," today repeats in 
other forms, "I vote, I participate, I am present, I am concerned" - mirror of a paradoxical mockery, mirror of 
the indifference of all public signification113. 
 
 
8. What has to be done?  
 
The last constitutional process of the EU, the constitutional debate, can be understood as a “project 
of democratisation”. The premise of the debate on the future of Europe was “the idea that 
institutional reforms could significantly improve the democratic quality of the Union and, by thus 
strengthening its normative legitimacy, bolster popular support for EU institutions”114. The goal 
was to decrease the legitimacy deficit by improving the democratic quality of the EU institutional 
architecture. However, the constitutional process revealed that the EU could not rely upon a silent 
majority – let alone a “debating majority” – with regard to far reaching treaty reforms, while the EU 
might still enjoys a certain degree of “permissive consensus” – passive and detached acceptance – 
for the “normal operations” of ordinary politics115. 
 
The challenge of democratizing the EU today has less to do with the institutional reforms than with 
the destruction of that “permissive consensus” surrounding the EU normal activities. Permissive 
consensus originates from the relative unconcern by the public about European policies, lack of 
interest and knowledge about the EU and its institutions, and from the surprisingly high degree of 
trust that the EU institutions enjoy in the public opinion. According to the Euro barometer the trust 
placed in the EU is higher than that placed in national governments and parliaments – in the case of 
Italy, this is hardly surprising. If the goal is to democratize the EU, the challenge is the ending of 
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such disinterest, ignorance, and of the trust-by-default relationship with the EU: the destruction of 
the silent majority. 
 
Indeed, the solution of the democratic deficit might well increase the European governance’s 
legitimacy deficit. Democracy produces legitimacy – voluntary acceptance – but it also produces 
illegitimacy – conflicts, rejections, resistance, non-compliance. Democracy presupposes the 
existence of conflict, and disagreement is essential to democracy no less then procedures. A 
democratic polity cannot enjoy full legitimacy, and a fully legitimate authority – an authority that 
encounters no opposition and is always obeyed – cannot be democratic in nature.  
 
Therefore, the issue of democratic deficit should be sharply distinguished from the issue of 
legitimacy deficit. If legal pluralism is right, then the legitimacy deficit might be structural and, 
most importantly, it might even prove to be a political opportunity if we maintain that cross-cutting 
and flexible authorities and allegiances can help to shape an open and inclusive political 
community. The legitimacy deficit might hint to a community which is freely chosen, rather than 
based on ethnic belongingness, authority and coercion.  
 
On the other side, the democratic deficit should be addressed and resolved, but its solution will not 
necessarily produce legitimacy. In any case, it will not be achieved only by means of institutional 
reforms. The quality of the democratic life does not depend only on rules, rights and procedures. 
Fundamental rights, the rule of law, fair election and voting procedures, important as they are, may 
not be sufficient to ensure democratic self-government. Democracy is not only a set of rules, it is 
also made up by the subjects who inhabit it, that is to say, real people in flesh and blood who are 
capable of engaging in meaningful political discussion and effective political action. Democracy 
requires procedures and constitutional standards, but it also requires social conflict and change. 
Thus, if we want the EU to become a democratic polity, permissive consensus should not be 
supported by publicity. It should be abolished and replaced by wide-ranging political discussion and 
focused disagreements. Even non-compliance with European law and effective campaigns against 
EU policies might in some cases be welcomed. 
 
The European project has much more to gain than to lose from becoming the subject of political and 
social conflicts and harsh political debate, at one condition. Public debate should not address many 
of the so-called EU’s “constitutional issues” currently under discussion. The debate should  focus 
on issues usually covered by permissive consensus – it should  address and affect the “normal 
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operations” of the EU, the everyday and ongoing decision-making process116. An inclusive and 
productive political debate, a debate which produces public involvement and democratic decisions, 
must address, to my eyes, issues such as the European arrest warrant, the measures on terrorism, the 
copyright directive, the ECJ decisions Laval and Viking on the unlawfulness of collective actions. 
According to one’s own political sensibility, other issues might well be identified. In any case, a 
democratic deliberative process should be primarily concerned with the substantive issues of the 
European politics117.  
 
As long as the goal is to promote meaningful public discussion “on the future of Europe”, the object 
of the debate should be the policies and the decisions of the EU and the Member States. Not only 
the future, but also the past and present of Europe should be discussed, if the goal is to create a 
European public sphere and to democratise the European governance. There is no point, however, 
in promoting public discussion on the procedures and competences of the governance agencies. 
 
Indeed, policy decisions directly affect people’s life – both of the European also of the Non-
European citizens – while procedures affect them only indirectly. Procedures change too quickly, 
and perhaps it is better so. Procedures are not the kind of “future” we can really choose. We lack 
too much information for making conscious decisions concerning procedural matters, and we also 
lack time and interest in gathering such information, because procedures affect us only indirectly. 
Paradoxically as it may sound, EU constitutional law may not be as politically relevant as the 
ordinary policies of the European governance, the “secondary norms” (the rules of recognition, 
change and adjudication) may not be as relevant as the “primary norms” (the rights and duties of the 
citizens), the “higher law” may not be as relevant as the lower, and the “law that regulates power” 
may not be as relevant as the decisions actually taken by the power. 
 
Unfortunately, the constitutional debate has not only been strongly hetero-directed and based on 
publicity, but it has also been almost void of substantive political contents and policy decisions. An 
astonishing example is provided by the provisions on the military instruments of the fight against 
terrorism. These provisions obtained low academic attention and no media coverage. Nonetheless, 
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here we find some of the most radical and potentially controversial political decisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty, all preserved by the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Nobody knows, even in France and the Netherlands, that the Constitutional Treaty literally 
constitutionalised the Bush doctrine of preventive war. Under the “solidarity clause”, the EU can 
“mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources … to … prevent the 
terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States” (Article I-43 CT; new Article 188 R TFEU 
after Lisbon). The Constitutional Treaty made it clear that the EU “may use civilian and military 
means” in the course of “joint disarmament operations … conflict prevention” and that the EU 
“contribute[s] to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating 
terrorism in their territories” (Article III-309 CT; new Article 28 B TEU). If the Constitutional 
Treaty had been approved by the national referendums, the Europeans would have had a 
Constitution stating, in its first part, that the “Member States shall undertake progressively to 
improve their military capabilities” (Article I-41 CT; new Article 28 B TEU)118. The Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty employ eleven times the words “terrorist” and “terrorism” – in the 
attempt of bringing itself “terroristically” closer to citizen, one is tempted to say119. 
 
However, the constitutional debate officially administered has not addressed these potentially 
controversial provisions. A sort of selective amnesia occurred in the quality newspapers, the 
political parties, the NGOs, and the epistemic communities, and the general public remained, and 
still is, totally unaware of the reforms going on. The democratic (open, inclusive, transparent) 
nature of the constitutional debate could not be more effectively refuted.  
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The first phase, the foundation of the Community, is an event both in the realm of international law 
and in that of international politics. It is a “highly political” phase, characterised by geopolitical 
considerations and by the political initiative of the six Member States. The second phase, the 
constitutionalisation process, is marked by the leading role of the ECJ and the national courts in the 
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shaping of a judicial constitution for Europe. A low political profile and massive constitutional 
innovations are the main features of the second phase. The third phase, the semi-permanent treaty 
revision process, is characterised by the establishment of a distinctive “economic constitution” of 
Europe and by the renewed commitment to European integration by the national governments. The 
centre of the fist phase can be located in the realm of “high”, top-down politics. The driving force of 
the second phase is placed in the domain of the law and in the low-profile constitutional politics of 
the courts. The centre of the third phase lies in economics: the neo-liberal politics pursued by the 
national governments represent the driving force of the third phase. I have argued that the centre of 
the fourth phase lies in publicity and, moreover, that the challenge of democratising the EU depends 
on the end of publicity and on its replacement with “low”, bottom-up politics, i.e. with meaningful 
political discussion and focused political conflicts. European integration would then have moved 
from “geopolitics”, to “law”, to “economy”, and finally to “democratic politics”. But this would 
require a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between transnational governance and political 
communication. 
 
 
